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Abstract. In this journal, D. Rizza [2010: 176] expounded a solution of what he called “the
indiscernibility problem for ante rem structuralism”, which is the problem to make sense of
the presence, in structures, of objects that are indiscernible yet distinct, by only appealing
to what that structure provides. We argue that Rizza’s solution is circular and expound
a different solution that not only solves the problem for completely extensive structures,
treated by Rizza, but for nearly (but not) all mathematical structures.
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According to the view of mathematics called ante rem structuralism, (i) the subject-matter
of mathematics consists of abstract structures, as Bourbaki famously promulgated; and (ii)
the objects of these abstract structures that are related to each other in various ways (by the
relations, mappings and operations that define the structure) have no properties by and from
themselves; their nature, in so far as they have one, is wholly determined by the structure
they inhabit and by nothing else besides (see, for example, Benacerraf [1965], Shapiro [1997],
Resnik [1997], Hellman [2001], Dummett [1991: 295], who calls this mystical structuralism).
These ‘objects’ are sometimes called ‘positions in the structure’ and sometimes ‘pure relata’.
Kera¨nen [2001] argued that if relata cannot be individuated while respecting the symme-
tries of the structure, they are not distinct individuals and therefore have to be identified,
which is absurd. If a line, or a plane, is a set of relata characterised by axioms in terms
of the ternary in-betweenness-relation, then no point has a property that any other point
lacks, and therefore they have to be identified, leading to the absurd conclusion that a line,
and a plane, consist of a single point. D. Rizza [2010: 175] adds that if the distinctness
(non-identity) of the points is taken as a primitive mathematical fact, their distinctness is
not accounted for by the structure, which conclusion is an unwelcome guest in the house of
ante rem structuralism.
“The issue then is to make sense of the simultaneous and seemingly contradictory presence
of distinctness and indiscernibility: I will call this the indiscernibility problem of ante rem
structuralism”, Rizza [2010: 176] writes. He expounds a solution at the hand of a complete
extensive structure:
S =
〈
X, <, +
〉
, (1)
where X is a non-empty set with a linear ordering (<) and an associative, commutative
operation (+) that is strictly monotonic wrt <, and further X is Dedekind-complete wrt <.
We shall be a little more explicit in discerning syntactics from semantics than Rizza.
Let L(S) be the language of S, ϕ(·) an open sentence of L(S) with one free variable, and
let T(S) be the theory of complete extensive structures; the background logic is classical
elementary predicate logic with identity. Then S (1) constitutes the standard model of
T(S), with assignment: x 7→ X , y 7→ Y , z 7→ Z, v 7→ V , and the satisfaction-relation. One
proves that set X is homogeneous, which is to say that the following schema holds:
S |= ∀x, y : ϕ(x) ←→ ϕ(y) , (2)
which is to say that we can prove in the meta-theory (some set-theory):
∀X, Y ∈ X : ϕS(X) ←→ ϕS(Y ) . (3)
The members of a homogeneous set are defined to be indiscernible, for what one can say
about any given member, one can say about every other member too. Let Aut(S) be the
set of automorphisms of S (1). One proves that for every automorphism f : X → X :
∀X ∈ X : ϕS(X) ←→ ϕS
(
f(X)
)
. (4)
One also proves that every two members of X can be connected by some automorphism:
∀X, Y ∈ X, ∃ f ∈ Aut(S) : f(X) = Y . (5)
Rizza [2010: 179–180] explains that homogeneous structures such as S (1) pose an indiscer-
nibility problem for ante rem structuralism. The key to solving it, Rizza continues, is to
let the automorphisms of S determine a co-ordinate chart over S with unit X . This comes
about as follows.
A co-ordinate chart with unit X , denoted by ΦX , is a mapping that sends every Y ∈ X
(1) to an automorphism fY ∈ Aut(S) that maps unit X to Y :
ΦX : X → Aut(S), Y 7→ ΦX [Y ] = fY , such that: X 7→ fY (X) = Y . (6)
Consider next Z ∈ X, different from both X and Y , and let ΦY [Z] = gZ , where gZ(Y ) = Z.
Since Aut(S) is an Abelian composition-group, we obtain:
Z = gZ(Y ) = gZ
(
fY (X)
)
= fY
(
gZ(X)
)
, (7)
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whence:
ΦX [Z] = ΦX [gZ(Y )] = ΦX [Y ] ◦ gZ = fY ◦ ΦY [Z] . (8)
Rizza [2010: 186] then draws the moral from chain (8): if X 6= Y , then automorphism
fY marks the transition from the co-ordinate chart with unit X to the chart with unit Y .
“This happens for any two distinct elements of X, so these elements are discriminated by the
different co-ordinate systems [charts] they give rise to.” And, trivially, if X = Y , then fY in
(8) becomes the identity-mapping on X, IX : X 7→ X , and the co-ordinate charts coincide:
ΦX [Z] = IX ◦ ΦY [Z] = ΦY [Z] . (9)
Thus in standard logical terminology, Rizza’s has proposed the following identity-criterion
for the members of X is:
X = Y iff ΦX = ΦY . (10)
But when are two of these co-ordinate charts different? What is the identity-criterion
for these co-ordinate charts? Well, in full generality, mappings are identical iff they send
the same thing to the same other thing; this becomse for the special case of the co-ordinate
charts:
ΦX = ΦY iff ∀Z ∈ X : ΦX [Z] = ΦY [Z] iff ∀Z ∈ X : fZ = gZ . (11)
The identity statement at the far right side of (11) is one between automorphisms on S.
Since they too are mappings, their identity-criterion is similar:
fZ = gZ iff ∀V ∈ X : fZ(V ) = gZ(V ) . (12)
Since f(V ) ∈ X and g(V ) ∈ X, the proposed identity-criterion for members of X (10) relies
on the identity between the objects in S (12), and hence (10) is circular. The co-ordinate
charts ΦX and ΦY account for the numerical diversity of X, that is, for X 6= Y , iff X 6= Y ,
which account thus is circular.
The very idea of having an identity-criterion is to have an open sentence in L(S) with two
free variables in which ‘=’ does not occur, say ψ(·, ·), such that it is demonstrably logically
equivalent to the identity-relation:
T(S) ` ∀x, y : ψ(x, y) ←→ x = y , (13)
and therefore:
∀X, Y ∈ X : ψS(X, Y ) ←→ X = Y . (14)
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We must conclude that Rizza’s proposal (10) is not an identity-criterion.
The key to a solution to Rizza’s (and Kera¨nen’s) problem is to distinguish between
absolute discernibility, which is discerning by means of properties, expressed by sentences of
one free variable, as in schema (2), and relational discernibility, which is discerning by means
of relations, expressed by sentences of two free variables. As soon as we have an identity-
criterion ψ(·, ·) (13), we have criterion for discernment, namely its negation, ¬ψ(·, ·), wherein
the identity-relation does not occur either. Can we find such a sentence ψ(·, ·) in L(S)?
Yes we can. Here comes such a relation. Definition:
D(x, y) iff x < y ∨ y < x , (15)
where we have, for the sake of clarity, confused ‘<’ in L(S) with its standard interpreta-
tion in S, which we have ab initio also called ‘<’ (1), rather than ‘<S’. If D(x, y), then
x 6= y, because relation < is irreflexive and anti-symmetric, and conversely. So we have a
distinctness-criterion:
T(S) ` ∀x, y : D(x, y) ←→ x 6= y , (16)
and therefore:
∀X, Y ∈ X : DS(X, Y ) ←→ X 6= Y . (17)
Hence the distinctness of X from Y is grounded in the relation <, which is part and parcel
of the structure S (1). So, after all, the members of X are distinguished by the structure,
moreover in an automorphic manner, due to: X < Y iff f(X) < f(Y ), for every f ∈Aut(S).
An identity-criterion for the objects in X then is¬D (15), which is of course also automorphic
and does not rely on ‘=’.
Everything is fine for structuralism. So what went wrong with Rizza? His definition of
indiscernibility below (2) is unacceptably restrictive: it is a definition of absolute indiscer-
nibility at best. True and utter indiscernibility encompasses both absolute and relational
discernibility, not only one of them, as Quine [1976] knew, but Rizza ignored, and Kera¨nen
[2001] as well. To spell it out, in case of a complete extensive structure, X, Y ∈ X are
relationally indiscernible iff the following schema holds for all sentences ρ(·, ·) in L(S) with
two free variables:
∀Z ∈ X : ρS(Z,X) ←→ ρS(Z, Y ) ∧ ∀V ∈ X : ρS(X, V ) ←→ ρS(Y, V ) . (18)
Restricting schema (18) to autmorphic sentences is not needed, because the automorphic
character of ρ(·, ·) is automatically guaranteed due to (4). Extensions beyond binary rela-
tions are possible (for futher kinds of discernibility, their logical interrelations, and the role
of symmetries, see Caulton and Butterfield [2011], and Ladyman, Linnebo and Pettigrew
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[2012]). In nearly all abstract structures, one can find a relation that grounds the numerical
diversity of their objects. For example, in the second case that Rizza [2010: 187–189] treats,
which is affine plane geometry, every pair of points in the plane are discerned by the following
relation: there is a point in between the points on the one line connecting them. The two
points then are identical iff there is no such point.
The rare cases where even relational discernibility is not possible are certain unlabelled
graphs, as pointed out by Ladyman & Leitgeb [2008], and certain categories, such as a
pre-order category with two objects and four arrows, two of which identity-arrows: the
nodes and objects in these respective structures are utterly indiscernible. Not only the
ante rem structuralist is unable to ground the quantitative numerosity of objects in these
rare structures qualitatively by the means provided by these structures and respecting their
symmetries, but no one is able to do this, because in these structures it is impossible to do
so. Therefore an ante rem structuralist view of these rare structures seems very difficult,
notwithstanding the fact that for nearly all other structures, the view seems impeccable —
which is not to deny that certain features of this stand in need of clarification, as pointed
out by e.g. Linnebo (2008).
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